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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
PlaintiftfAppellee,

:
:

Case No. 20000135-CA

vs.

:

Priority No. 2

VALERIE D. THOMPSON,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

:

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(c).
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Whether the trial court committed clear error in requiring the trial of the
Appellant to proceed concurrently with the trial of Appellant's daughter?
A trial court's legal conclusions are reviewed for "correctness". State v. Pena,
869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994).
To obtain appellate relief, the Appellant must demonstrate that: "(i) an error
exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; (iii) the error is
harmful..." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1208 (Utah 1993)
2. Whether the trial court committed clear error in allowing the Appellant's
counsel to proceed at a joint trial representing both Appellant and her daughter, or did

the trial court have an obligation to determine that both defendants were advised of the
potential conflict of interest and insure that a voluntary waiver of joint representation
was made by the two defendants?
To obtain relief, the Appellant must meet the standard set forth above under
paragraph 1.
3. Whether Appellant was denied effective assistance counsel where she was
represented by the same attorney as her daughter at a joint trial involving conflicting
issues and interests?
A claim of ineffectiveness presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v.
Templin, 805 P.2d 182,186 (Utah 1990).
"Where the ineffective assistance claim is first raised on direct appeal, this court
can only determine that the defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel if it
can do so as a matter of law...If counsel's performance is clearly deficient, but
prejudice cannot be determined on the record before us, remand is appropriate." State
v. Snyder, 860 P.2d 351,354 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Tennyson, 805 P.2d 461,465
(Utah App. 1993).
To establish a claim of ineffective counsel, defendants must show: "(1) that his
counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, and (2) that
the outcome of the trial would probably have been different but for counsel's error."
2

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2025 (1984); State v. Hunt, 781
P.2d 473, 477 (Utah App. 1989).
4. Whether the trial court erred in convicting appellant upon a notice which did
not comply with the provisions of Utah Code Annotated §§ 53a-l 1-101(3) and 53a-l 1103(l)(b)?
The question of whether or not the notice required by §§ 53a-l 1-101(3) and 53a1 l-103(l)(b) was met by the notice provided to the Appellant is a question of law. A
trial court's legal conclusions are reviewed for "correctness". State v. Pena, 869 P.2d
932 (Utah 1994).
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Relevant statutory provisions are set forth in the addendum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
Valerie D. Thompson appeals from the judgment, sentence and commitment

imposed by the Honorable Scott N. Johansen on January 20, 2000, after a bench trial
at which she was convicted of one count of violation of Utah Code Ann. § 53a-l 1-101
(3) Compulsory Education Violation, A Class B Misdemeanor. (R. 83)
B.

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition
Appellant was charged with violating the Compulsory Education Act by not
3

responding to written request of her pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated
§ 53a-ll-103(l)(b) by a local school board or school district, case number 983932,
a criminal prosecution. On December 16, 1999, Appellant entered a plea of not guilty
and the matter was set for trial. (R. 02) On January 20,2000, Appellant was tried at a
bench trial before the Honorable Scott N. Johansen. At the same trial, Appellant's
daughter, E.T., was tried in case number 964962 for two truancy violations. Both
Appellant and E.T. were represented in the trial by Keith Chiara (R.26:2). Following
a bench trial at which evidence was presented by the State against both Appellant and
E.T., Appellant was convicted of a Class B Misdemeanor by failing to respond to a
written request delivered to her pursuant to the statute and sentenced to six months in
the Emery County Jail and a fine of $500.00. All but two days of the jail time was
suspended (R. 26:83, 95-96).
C.

Appellate Court Proceedings and Disposition
On February 10, 2000, Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal, appealing her

conviction to this court. Appellant filed a Rule 23B Motion to Remand which was
denied by this court on September 12,2000.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
Appellant was charged with violating the Compulsory Education Act by not
responding to written request of her by a local school board or school district pursuant
4

to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated § 53a-l l-103(l)(b), case number 983932.
Appellant's daughter, E.T., also had been charged with truancy violations which were
also scheduled for trial on the same day (R. 26: 2). The trial court, prosecutor and
defense counsel were unsure of which matters were before the court for trial, with the
Appellant's counsel indicating to the court that he thought that the matters were there
for review (R. 26:2-6). Defense counsel indicated that because of the confusion, he had
requested a continuance of the matters in order to be prepared (R. 26: 3-4).
There was no advisement on the record in which the court advised either the
Appellant or E.T. that there may be a conflict of interest by Mr. Chira representing both
parties. At several times during the hearing, defense counsel indicated to the court that
he was confused, not sure of what evidence he could present, and what issues were
before the court (R.26: 5,21,23-24). At one point, during the State's examination of
a witness concerning statements made to him by Appellant relating to E.T.'s case,
defense counsel objected, then realizing that Appellant was also a defendant, withdrew
his objection (R.26:19).
The State called one witness, Merlin Weber, principal of San Rafael Junior High
School, who testified that E.T. had been registered for the 1999-2000 school year
(R.26: 11). Mr. Weber testified that he sent state's exhibits 5,6,7, and 8 addressed
to Appellant R.26:16-19). Exhibit 6 was the only letter which requested the Appellant
5

to "come in and talk about how to solve the problem." Other than the letters sent by
principal Weber, there were no notices sent by any official of the Emery County School
District.
Both Appellant and E.T. testified during the trial. Appellant testified as to the
medical and other reasons why E.T. had not attended school (R. 26: 40-55). She also
testified to numerous contacts with school personnel and attempts to contact Mr.
Weber the school principal concerning E.T.'s failure to attend school in the school year
beginning September 1999 (R.26: 61-64).
The trial court found: "I find beyond a reasonable doubt that the mother, and
there is no evidence with respect to the father and he hasn't been charged, that the
mother knowingly refused to respond to written request delivered to her pursuant to the
provisions of the section" (R.26: 83).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellant raises four issues on appeal. One, that the trial court erred in requiring
the trial of the Appellant to proceed at the same time as the trial of her daughter E.T.
First, Appellant argues that the elements of the ofifenses which were tried were
different; second, that the defendants were not co-defendants and that joiner was
improper; third, that evidence which would not be available in Appellant's case had
there not been a joint trial was allowed since she was tried in the same proceeding as
6

her daughter; and fourth, that the court was able to consider evidence which was not
relevant to the case of Appellant, but which was relevant to the case of the daughter
which affected the court's determination in Appellant's case.
Two, that the trial court erred in requiring Appellant's counsel to proceed in
representing Appellant and her juvenile daughter in the same proceeding. Upon being
informed by trial counsel, that he was not aware of the nature of the proceedings, that
he was not prepared to proceed and having requested a continuance to ascertain the
nature of the proceedings, the trial court had an obligation to inquire of the Appellant
and juvenile whether they both agreed to joint representation and whether they
understood the potential conflict of interest by being represented by one attorney in a
proceeding which combined to distinctively different offenses. Appellant argues that
the "fairness" considered by the appellate court in State v. Classon, 935 P.2d. 524 was
not available to Appellant where counsel at the outset of the trial was not aware he
would be representing Appellant at trial. The trial court had an obligation to ensure that
fairness or at least obtain a voluntary waiver of conflict of interest by advising
Appellant of the conflict and obtaining a knowing waiver prior to forcing the joint trial.
Third, Appellant argues that defense counsels representation of the Appellant
was ineffective where he indicated to the court that he was not aware of the nature of
the proceedings, that he did not understand that he would be representing the Appellant
7

at trial, where he was not aware that E.T. was also going to be tried at the same time,
and where the issues and elements of the two offenses against the joint defendants were
different.
Fourth, Appellant argues that the court erred as a matter of law infindingthat
she had received the notice required by Utah Code Ann. § 53a-l l-103(b)(l) where the
exhibit and the evidence indicated that all notice to her was sent, not by the school
district or local school board as required by statute, but by the principal of the junior
high school. Appellant argues that where criminal sanctions are to be imposed, the
State must prove that strict compliance with the requirements of the statute must be
followed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR IN
REQUIRING THE TRIAL OF THE APPELLANT TO PROCEED
CONCURRENTLY WITH THAT OF E.T.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-801(l)(f) establishes jurisdiction in the juvenile courts
for the prosecution of the offense of failing to comply with the compulsory education
requirements of U.C.A. § 53a-l 1-101. Section 78-3a-802(2) requires that proceedings
under the section be governed by the statutes and rules governing criminal proceedings
in the district court. In this case, the trial court ordered the trial of Appellant to be
8

joined together with the trial of E.T., a juvenile charged under a totally separate
provision of the code.
The statue which governs when defendants may be joined for trial in the adult
system is U.C.A. § 77-8a-l. That section provides that the only time two defendants
can be joined for trial is when the offenses and the defendants could have been joined
in a separate Information. U.C.A. § 77-8a-l(3)(a) Two defendants may be joined in
a separate Information only if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or
conduct or in the same criminal episode. U.C.A. § 77-8a-l(l)(b) Based upon the
provisions cited, even if the Appellant and E.T. were adults, they could not be joined
for trial since the elements of the offenses involve different conduct undertaken at
different time periods. The offense of truancy involve the failure to attend school
without a legitimate excuse. The offense of committing a violation of the mandatory
education act as charged against the Appellant requires simply that after receiving a
written requestfromthe school for parental support in securing regular attendance, the
defendant fails to respond. The elements are totally dissimilar.
Although the statute in subsection (4)(b) indicates that a defendant's right to
sever is waived if the motion is not made at leastfivedays prior to trial, Appellant was
foreclosedfrommaking that motion since prior to the actual start of the trial, the parties
and offenses were not joined, but were only joined at the trial court's insistence at the
9

beginning of Appellant's trial. Although the court did ask counsel representing both
the Appellant and E.T. whether he had any objection to a joint proceeding, that
question was asked at the time when E.T.'s counsel was not aware that her truancy had
not already been determined. (R.26: 2-3) After the court and counsel determined that
in fact E.T.'s truancy allegations had not been proven, there was no further discussion
concerning the effect of the joint trial on the rights of the Appellant or E.T.
Further, there is no provision for the joining of the trial of an adult charged in the
juvenile system with that of a juvenile defendant. The court's error in this regard is
clearly erroneous and requires reversal.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN PROCEEDING
WITH APPELLANT'S TRIAL COUNSEL REPRESENTING
BOTH APPELLANT AND E.T. WITHOUT INVESTIGATING
POTENTIAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST
At the beginning of the trial, after the trial court had determined to proceed
with a joint trial and was aware and expected that Appellant's counsel would also
represent E.T., the trial court made no inquiry or investigation as to whether or not the
dual representation caused any conflict of interest on the part of either Appellant or
E.T. "The sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel includes the right
to counselfreefromconflicts of interest" (State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65,79 (Utah App.
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1990). In State v. Velarde, 806 P.2d 1190 (Utah App. 1991), this Court held that when
two co-defendants are "separately represented by two public defenders from the same
office and the potential conflict is brought to the attention of the court before or during
the early stages of trial, the trial court must take adequate steps to resolve the issue.
If the trial court fails to investigate such a potential conflict of interest, we presume
prejudice and reverse" (806 P.2d at 1192).
Appellant argues that although the issue of conflict was not brought up by her
counsel at the time of trial, the issue was obvious, in that one attorney was representing
two defendants and the attorney was under the impression that E.T.'s case was not set
for trial.

He was of the impression that E.T.'s guilt had been established and the

matter was only on for review. Defense counsel's comments indicated that he had
previously requested a continuance of the court in order to determine which matters
were actually before the court. The court did not grant the continuance nor did the court
allow counsel time to confer with his clients to discuss any potential conflict.

The

comments of the court and counsel are particularly revealing in that regard:
THE COURT: I show we have two trials back to back here. Which one
do you want to do first?
MR. LANGSTON: I was going to ask Your Honor how the court wants
to proceed? It is the same witnesses and we can actually proceed with both of
them together or we can do it separate. However the court desires to do it.
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THE COURT: Well, there is no sense hearingfromthem twice, but.
MR. LANGSTON: That is my feeling.
MR. CHIARA: Are we trying Elise's truancy? Is that what is going on?
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. LANGSTON: Yes. Right.
THE COURT: Do you have any objections taking all of the testimony at
once and then we can separate at argument?
MR. CHIARA: That is okay. I have been informed by the prosecutor
though that the court had already determined that Elise was truant. That all
earnest and persistent efforts has been made. I had just assumed that decision
had already been made in a previous hearing.
THE COURT: No, what happened is Elise had a truancy last year and
there was a diversion and it was determined that she had not complied with the
terms of the diversion but I believe that a new petition was filed or we still back
on the old deal?
MR. LANGSTON: The way I understand it is then we reinstated the old
petition, the old, because the court has already ruled in the December hearing
that the terms of the old diversion were not complied with so that was set aside
and so we are now back to where was originally with that petition with the
truancy. The court has not made a determination whether she was in fact truant
or not, just that a diversion agreement was not complied with.
MR. CHIARA: Right.
MR. LANGSTON: So we are here, as I understand it, for trial on that
original truancy and that also on the new charges that wefiledagainst Valerie
for the failure to comply with the compulsory education laws. Those are two
matters that I understand we are on trial on.
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THE COURT: What period of time is the truancy for? That is the critical
question.
MR. LANGSTON: That would be up until December 18th, I think is the
way it wasfiledof last, of 1998. And that wasfiledby Miss Manley back then
and that was originally diverted. Then wefiledthe new charges against Valerie
that has to do with the period up untilfromthis last school year up until basically
when the charges werefiledin December.
MR. CHIARA: See these are part of the reasons I was asking this court
to continue this. To give me time to know just what is going on and be prepared
on that. I haven't (inaudible).
THE COURT: Just a minute. Let me straighten this out, because I don't
think Mr. Langston'srighton this. On the 6th of January we took an arraignment
on a new truancy charge, incident number four. The original truancy was
incident number one. And so the new truancy charge was denied, set for trial
today, and that the critical date there is November 29th of '99.
Incident number one, the original truancy charge is still out there. I
assumed that if we took care of the new truancy that the other one would go
away, but that has never been said. So we have a truancy on Elise, a new
truancy, that is incident number four, even though it says on the docket that it is
one.
THE CLERK: (Inaudible) it was denied and the assistant county attorney
(inaudible).
THE COURT: Oh, alright, then Mr. Langston is right.
THE CLERK: It hasn't been.
THE COURT: Let me back up, Mr. Chiara. Thefirstincident number one
was the first truancy that was diverted. She failed the diversion. It is now on
trial today. Incident number four was the second truancy, it was denied on the
6th of January and not set for trial. It has gone to the county attorney's office for
screening. So that is what we are here on, incident number one, and then the
parents information. So let's...
13

MR. CHIARA: All I have in my hands, it looks like, is number four for
November 29th o f 99. I would request if the court, if the prosecutor is going to
prosecute on that that we be allowed to put on evidence as to whether earnest
and persistent efforts were made to comply with that diversion agreement.
There is a witness here that I think can testify to the court that earnest and
persistent efforts were made.
THE COURT: The issue about the diversion agreement is behind us. That
is res judicata.
MR. CHIARA: I understand except that my client that Mrs. Thompson
tells me that she thought it was just a review hearing on how things were going.
She wasn't aware that it was a matter where...
THE COURT: She was here and she had it explained to her what it was
about. We are not going to Ungate things twice. The trial will be on whether or
not the incident number one, the truancy, is well taken or not. Not whether the
diversion agreement was complied with. That's...
MR. CHIARA: Can I have a copy of that then because I don't even have
a copy of it.
THE COURT: Yes we can make one in the course of things. I am not
going to slow down here where we are already an hour late. All it says is it is
a typical truancy language and the critical date is December 18,1998.
MR. CHIARA: 1998?
MR. LANGSTON: 1998.
MR. CHIARA: '98.
THE COURT: And in the course of while we are getting started we will
have this copied and give you a copy of it.
MR. CHIARA: Excuse me, Your Honor, I have found a copy of it.
(R. 26: 2-5)
14

The foregoing exchange indicates that the court, prosecutor and the defense
counsel were confused as to exactly what was being heard. Once the court was aware
that defense counsel was not aware that E.T.'s case was actually on for trial, not just
for a review, the court should have inquired concerning the conflict of interest and
made a record. Under these circumstances, the court had a duty to insure that both
defendants understood the potential conflict and agreed to the joint representation.
POINT III
APPELLANT WAS DEPRIVED OF HER SIXTH
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
The Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective assistance of counsel includes the
right to be assisted by counsel who plays the role necessary to ensure that the trial is
fair. Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, at 685. In State v. Classon, 935 P.2d 524 (Utah App.
1997) at 533, this Court observed:
Courts have discussed many examples of attorney conduct that may
undermine the proper functioning of the adversarial process. For example, in
conjunction with its discussion of what constitutes ineffective assistance of
counsel, the Supreme Court in Strickland listed a variety of duties belonging to
counsel which, if not adhered to, may result in ineffective assistance. The Court
noted an attorney is required to: advocate the defendant's cause, avoid conflicts
of interest, "consult with the defendant on important decisionsf,] and keep the
defendant informed of important developments in the course of the prosecution."
Id. at 688,104 S.Ct. At 2065. Failure to investigate is also a form of attorney
conduct that may undermine the adversarial process. See State v. Templin, 805
P.2d 182,188 (Utah 1990). Moreover, some conduct, such as various kinds of
state interference with counsel's assistance and active representation of
15

conflicting interests, is so egregious that it is presumed to result in prejudice to
defendant's defense. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692, 104 S.Ct. At 2067
In Classon, this Court recognized that the two-prong Strickland test usually
requires that the defendant establish that first, counsel's representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness. Second, a defendant must show that counsel's
errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial whose result is reliable.
Classon, 935 P.2d at 532. Appellant contends that trial counsel's conduct in not at
least requesting a recess in order to discuss the nature of the proceedings with the two
defendants, advise them of the potential conflicts, and withdraw from representation
of one or the other in the event that the conflict in representation could not be resolved
fell below the objective standard of reasonableness. Further, it is obvious from the
record cited above in the conversation between the court and counsel, that counsel was
not sure what proceedings were taking place and did not feel prepared to proceed.
It is also clearfromthe transcript, that counsel felt his lack of preparation to be
such that he requested the court continue the matters in order to determine what was
actually before the court and to "know just what is going on and to be prepared on
that." (R. 26: 3-4). The record is not clear when that request was made, but it is
undisputedfromthe record, that defense counsel had made the request because he did
not feel prepared to proceed and the record cited above indicates his confusion and lack

16

of preparation.
In addition, counsel agreed to proceed to try both defendants cases at once and
to represent both defendants although it is apparent that his agreement occurred at a
time when he was not aware that E.T.'s case involved a trial. Had counsel not agreed,
the conflict issue may have been less of a problem in the event the court would have
proceeded on one case at a time. (Based upon the demeanor of the trial judge and his
comments as set forth above, counsel's objection to joint trial may have been futile).
The fault here does not only lie with the defense counsel. Appellant argues that
the record cited above demonstrates the failure of the trial court to allow the
Appellant's counsel a continuance to become prepared, or even an opportunity to have
a copy of some of the pleadings which were involved. (R. 26: 5) The court was not
going to take the time to inquire into any conflicts or concerns whether obvious or
expressed. "I am not going to slow down here where we are already an hour late." (R.
26: 5).
Further, defense counsel did not address whether the state had proved the
elements of the offense against the Appellant, either in his presentation of evidence
through the testimony of Appellant and her husband, nor did he address the elements
in his closing argument to the court.
The elements of the offense of Compulsory Education Violation as it applies in
17

this case, since the evidence indicated that the Appellant did register E.T. in school for
the 1999-2000 school year, are as follows:
1. That between September 1999 and December 1999;
2. In Emery County, State of Utah;
3. The defendant, a parent, refused to respond to a written request from the
school district or local school board for parental support in securing regular attendance
by the minor delivered by certified mail;
4. The notice must contain notice of the requirements of §53a-l 1-103 and state
that refusal to respond to the notice is a Class B Misdemeanor.
The basis of the charge was the failure to respond after receiving a written
request from a local school board or school district. Defense counsel's direct and
cross-examination of the witnesses as well as his closing argument to the court did not
address those elements. Other than a question of the Appellant as to the contacts she
had with the school personnel, there were no questions tying those contacts in time with
the receipt of the communications from Mr. Weber, the school principal, upon which
the State was basing its case. (R. 26: 61-62) There was no argument made to the court
that the Appellant had made contact with the school even though State's Exhibit 7, the
letter dated November 24, 1999,(Addendum "A") from Mr. Weber to Appellant
indicates that contacts were made, in that Weber obviously responds to the inquiry of
18

the Appellant about homework and how to handle that situation. The letter does not
request any further meetings with Weber or the local school district.

This

communication follows the November 15, 1999, letter, State's Exhibit 6, which,
although the letter does not contain the notice requirements of the statute, does request
a meeting to "please come in and lets talk about the problem." (Addendum "B").
This evidence is consistent with the testimony of Appellant wherein she testified
that in response to the certified letters, she contacted the school and attempted to talk
with Mr. Weber, and when she did and was not able to talk with him, she left messages
with the secretary and requested he call her back. (R.26: 57-59) This is also consistent
with Mr. Weber's testimony that he was aware that Appellant had tried to reach him
at the school on at least two occasions. (R.26:19-20)
Appellant maintains that counsel's ineffectiveness as set forth above deprived
her of a fair trial. The acknowledged lack of preparation, lack of awareness as to the
nature of the proceedings, and failure to address the issue of conflict with Appellant
create a situation in which Appellant maintains prejudice is presumed. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, at 692.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR
IN FINDING THAT THE APPELLANT FAILED TO
COMPLY WITH THE REQUEST OF THE SCHOOL DISTRICT
19

A. The notice sent to appellant did not comply with the requirements of
U.C.A. §53a-ll-101(3) and § 53a-ll-303(l)(b).
As set forth in Appellant's argument above, one of the elements of the offense
of Compulsory Education Violation, is that the defendant receive a notice complying
with the provisions of §53a-l l-101(3)(b). One of the requirements is that the notice
be "delivered by a local school board or school district". The district involved in this
case is the Emery County School District. All of the communications sent to the
Appellant werefromMr. Merlin Weber, principal of San Rafael Junior High School.
Mr. Weber is not a member of the Emery County School District, nor was there any
evidence that he was authorized or requested to act on behalf of the district. All were
signed in his capacity as principal, not as a representative of the district. He was not
elected or authorized by law to act on behalf of a local board or district. From the
context of the statute, it is apparent that the school board or district is empowered to
review the situation where there are allegations of a parent who is alleged to have
violated the statute, determine the necessity to proceed under the statute, and then send
the written request. A requestfroma school principal does not meet the statute.
The court erred infindingthat Appellant had failed to comply with a request of
the school district and her conviction should be overturned.
B. The evidence indicated that Appellant did comply with the request.
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Should this Court determine that the notice to Appellant did meet the statutory
requirements, Appellant argues that her actions did indicate a response. As is set forth
above, Appellant did respond to the letters of the principal by placing calls in an
attempt to contact him. She indicated that she had gone to the school to pick up
homework for E.T. The principal acknowledged that he returned at least two of the
calls. The requests did not direct Appellant to contact anyone at the district office since
the letters were notfromthe district, butfromthe principal. In the November 24,1999,
letterfromprincipal Weber, he addresses issues which have obviously been raised by
Appellant in her contact with the school.
Further, there is no direction in the letters as to any deadline by which Appellant
must contact the district, no place at which she was to appear, nor was there any
indication as to whom she should contact other than principal Weber. In addition, the
tenor of the November 24, 1999, letter does not suggest that criminal action will be
pursued by anyone. The letter simply indicates the hope that the homework resolution
will work out and reminds the Appellant that in the case of absence of E.T., Appellant
should call in and sent in a doctor's note.
Based upon the evidence in the record, Appellant contends the court erred in
finding that she had violated the statute beyond a reasonable doubt.
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the arguments set forth above, Appellant asks the Court to vacate
her conviction on the grounds that the trial court failed to adequately investigate the
issue of conflict of interest, that the trial court improperly required Appellant to proceed
with a joint trial with her juvenile daughter, that she was denied the effective assistance
of counsel at the trial, that trial court erred in ruling that the notice sent to Appellant
complied with the statutes and that the trial court erred infindingthat Appellant failed
to respond to a requestfroma school board or district.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 11th day of October, 2000.

7
MICHAEL D.ESPLM
Counsel for Valerie D. Thompson

^

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, this 11th day of October, 2000,
two copies of the foregoing Brief of Defendant/Appellant to the following:
Jan Graham
Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
PO Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-0854
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ADDENDUM
Utah Code Annotated §53 a-11-101(3)
Utah Code Annotated §53a-l l-103(l)(b)
Utah Code Annotated §77-8a-l
Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3(2)(c)
Utah Code Annotated §78-3a-801(l)(f)
Utah Code Annotated §78-3a-802(2)
"A"

State's Exhibit 7, letter dated November 24, 1999

"B"

State's Exhibit 6, letter dated November 15, 1999
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53A-11-101

STATE SYSTEM OF PUBLIC EDUCATION

PARTI
COMPULSORY EDUCATION REQUIREMENTS
53A-11-101. Responsibility for minor required to attend
school — Penalty for violation.
(1) For purposes of this part:
(a) "Habitual truant" is a school-age minor who has received more than
two truancy citations within one school year from the school in which the
minor is or should be enrolled and eight absences without a legitimate-or
valid excuse or who, in defiance of efforts on the part of school authorities
to resolve a student's attendance problem as required under Section
53A-11-103, refuses to regularly attend school or any scheduled period of
the school day.
(b) "Minor* means a person under the age of 18 years.
(c) "Parent" includes:
(i) a custodial parent of the minor;
(ii) a legally appointed guardian of a minor; or
(iii) any other person purporting to exercise any authority over the
minor which could be exercised by persons listed under Subsections
(l)(c)(i) and (ii) above.
(d) "School-age minor" means a minor who has reached the age of six
years but has not reached the age of eighteen years, but does not include
a minor emancipated by marriage.
(e) "Truancy citation" is an administrative notice to a truant minor
requiring an appearance before the school truancy control officer or body
from which the minor is truant.
(f) "Truant minor" is any school-age minor who is subject to the state's
compulsory education law and who is absent from school without a
legitimate or valid excuse.
(2) A parent shall enroll and send a school-age minor to a public or regularly
established private school during the school year of the district in which the
minor resides.
(3) It is a class B misdemeanor for a parent to knowingly:
(a) fail to enroll a school-age minor in school; or
(b) refuse to respond to a written request which is delivered to the
parent pursuant to the provisions of Subsection 53A-ll-103(l)(b) by a local
school board or school district.
(4) The provisions of this section do not apply to a parent of a school-age
minor who has been declared by the local school board to be exempt from school
attendance in conformity with Section 53A-11-102.
(5) A local board of education or school district shall report violations of
Subsection (3) to the appropriate city, county, or district attorney.
History: C. 1953, 53A-11-101, enacted by
L. 1988, ch. 2, § 146; 1990, ch. 78, § 32; 1999,
ch. 99, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The% 1999 amendment, effective May 3,1999, added Subsections
(1) and (4), redesignating former Subsections
(1), (2), and (3) as (2), (3), and (5); in Subsection
(2) substituted "parent" for "person having con-

trol of a minor between six and 18 years of age"
and substituted "enroll and send a school-age
minor" for "send the minor"; rewrote Subsection (3); deleted former Subsection (4), which
provided that juvenile court officers were immediately to take appropriate action; in Subsection (5) inserted "or school district" and
substituted "violations of Subsection (3)" for
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53A-11-103, Duties of boards of education in resolving
child's attendance problems — Parental involvement — Issuance of truancy citations — Procedure for contesting citations — Liability not
imposed.
(1) For each school-age minor who is or should be enrolled within that school
district, the local school board or school district shall make efforts to resolve a
minor's school attendance problems. Those efforts shall include, as reasonably
feasible:
(a) counseling of the minor by school authorities;
(b) a written request for parental support in securing regular attendance by the minor delivered by certified mail, containing notice of the
requirements of this section and stating that refusal to respond to the
notice is a class B misdemeanor;
(c) at least one meeting with the minor and the parents;
(d) any necessary adjustment to the curriculum and schedule to meet
special needs of the minor; and
(e) monitoring school attendance of the minor for a period not to exceed
30 days.
(2) In addition to the efforts listed in Subsection (1), the local school board
or school district may enlist the assistance of community and law enforcement
agencies as appropriate and reasonably feasible.
(3) In the event that the minor's school attendance problem cannot be
resolved by the efforts of the local school board or school district, the local
school board or school district shall refer the school-age minor to the appropriate district or county attorney or juvenile court as a habitual truant.
(4) Any parent of a school-age minor shall, upon written request from a local
school board or school district, cooperate with school authorities in resolving
the minor's school attendance problem.
(5) A local school board may authorize the issuance of truancy citations by
school administrators and appointed truancy specialists. Recipients of truancy
citations may be subjected to administrative penalties, and to a fee assessed in
accordance with a uniform fee schedule adopted by the State Board of
Education.
(6) A local school board that authorizes the issuance of truancy citations
shall establish a procedure for students to contest citations. Any minor having
received three prior truancy citations within a single school year and for whom
reasonable efforts to resolve the attendance problem have failed, shall be
issued a habitual truancy citation and referred by the local school board or
school district to the appropriate county or district attorney or juvenile court as
a habitual truant. Proceedings for habitual truancy shall be expedited by the
court.
(7) This section shall not impose any civil liability on boards of education or
their employees. Proceedings initiated under this part do not obligate or
preclude action by the Division of Child and Family Services under Section
78-3a-316.
History: C. 1953, 63A-11-103, enacted by
L. 1988, ch. 143, § 1; 1990, ch. 78, § 34; 1995,

ch. 302, § 4; 1996, ch. 1, § 5; 1999, ch. 99, § 3.
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amend-
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which one actually stabbed the victim, the
procedure was a showup, and accordingly, defendant did not have the right to have counsel

present. State v. Mincy, 838 R2d 648 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992).

77-8-3. Conduct of peace officer.
The peace officers conducting a lineup shall not attempt to influence the
identification of any particular suspect.
History: C. 1953, 77-8-3, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

77-8-4. Record of proceedings — Access by suspect.
The entire lineup procedure shall be recorded, including all conversations
between the witnesses and the conducting peace officers. The suspect shall
have access to and may make copies of the record and any photographs taken
of him or any other persons in connection with the lineup.
History: C. 1953, 77-8-4, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

CHAPTER 8a
CRIMINAL OFFENSE CHARGES
Section
77-8a-l.

Joinder of offenses and of defendants.

77-8a-l. Joinder of offenses and of defendants.
(1) Two or more felonies, misdemeanors, or both, may be charged in the
same indictment or information if each offense is a separate count and if the
offenses charged are:
(a) based on the same conduct or are otherwise connected together in
their commission; or
(b) alleged to have been part of a common scheme or plan.
(2) (a) When a felony and misdemeanor are charged together the defendant
is afforded a preliminary hearing with respect to both the misdemeanor
and felony offenses.
(b) Two or more defendants may be charged in the same indictment or
information if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or
conduct or in the same criminal episode.
(c) The defendants may be charged in one or more counts together or
separately and all of the defendants need not be charged in each count.
(d) When two or more defendants are jointly charged with any offense,
they shall be tried jointly unless the court in its discretion on motion or
otherwise orders separate trials consistent with the interests of justice.
(3) (a) The court may order two or more indictments or informations or both
to be tried together if the offenses, and the defendants, if there is more
than one, could have been joined in a single indictment or information.
606
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(b) The procedure shall be the same as if the prosecution were under a
single indictment or information.
(4) (a) If the court finds a defendant or the prosecution is prejudiced by a
joinder of offenses or defendants in an indictment or information or by a
joinder for trial together, the court shall order an election of separate trials
of separate counts, grant a severance of defendants, or provide other relief
as justice requires.
(b) A defendant's right to severance of offenses or defendants is waived
if the motion is not made at least five days before trial. In ruling on a
motion by defendant for severance, the court may order the prosecutor to
disclose any statements made by the defendants which he intends to
introduce in evidence at the trial.
History: C. 1953, 77-8a-l, e n a c t e d b y L.
1990, c h . 201, § 1.
Compiler's Notes. — This section is a recodification of former Rule 9 of the Utah Rules
of Criminal Procedure. Notes to cases constru-

ing t h a t rule are included in the notes to this
section.
Cross-References. — Limited admissibility
of evidence, Rule 105, U.R.E.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
flight from the scene of the murder. State v.
Scales, 946 P.2d 377 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).

ANALYSIS

Common scheme or plan.
Denial of severance.
—Harmless error.
—Standard of review.
Discretion of trial court.
Failure to request severance.
Joinder or severance of defendants.
—Antagonistic defenses.
—Cautionary instructions.
—Specific cases.
—Waiver of objections.
Joinder or severance of offenses.
—In general.
—Specific cases.
—Waiver of objections.
Motions to sever.
—Timeliness.
Prejudicial joinder.
Cited.

D e n i a l of s e v e r a n c e .
— H a r m l e s s error.
Even though the trial court erred in refusing
to sever the trial of codefendants based on
antagonistic defenses, that error, as well as any
resulting constitutional error, was harmless.
State v. Telford, 940 R2d 522 (Utah Ct. App.
1997).
— S t a n d a r d of r e v i e w .
A denial of severance will be reversed by the
appellate court only iif it is affirmatively shown
t h a t a defendant's right to a fair trial has been
impaired. State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 440 (Utah
1986).

Common s c h e m e or plan.
In a case charging aggravated robberies
based on two separate incidents with parallel
fact patterns, i.e., defendant went to gay bars,
targeted gay men, offered them a ride on his
motorcycle, drove them to a canyon, robbed
them at knife point, forced them to undress,
scattered their clothes, and left t h e m alone in
the canyon, there was sufficient basis for t h e
trial court to conclude that the crimes were
"alleged to have been part of a common scheme
or plan" under this section. State v. Lee, 831
R2d 114 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Murder and theft charges were connected
together and were alleged to be p a r t of a common scheme or plan where defendant's purpose
in taking a car and firearms was to facilitate his

D i s c r e t i o n of trial court.
In absence of showing that trial court abused
its discretion, appellate court will not interfere
with action of the t n a l court in denying separ a t e trials to two defendants charged with
gambling violation. State v. Burke, 102 U t a h
249, 129 P.2d 560 (1942).
Where accused cannot demand a severance
as a matter of right, it must appear t h a t t h e
trial court had before it facts indicating t h a t
accused would be unduly prejudiced by a joint
trial before the Supreme Court will hold t h a t
the trial court abused its discretion in denying
the motion. State v. Miller, 111 Utah 255, 177
P.2d 727 (Utah 1947).
The grant or denial of severance is a matter
within the discretion of the trial judge. State v.
Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338 (Utah 1977), c e r t denied,
439 U.S. 882, 99 S. Ct. 219, 58 L. Ed. 2d 194
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teen-year-old boy without making effort to determine whether he was a juvenile, nor
whether he was giving his true name and
address, the defendant aided and encouraged
the juvenile to violate former § 58-17-14.13 by
using a false name to procure drugs, and where
defendant's conduct was shown to be "criminal
negligence," he was guilty of contributing to the
delinquency of a minor. State v. Tritt, 23 Utah
2d 365, 463 P.2d 806, 36 A.L.R.3d 1283 (1970).
— Proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Prosecution had burden of proving defendant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt in juvenile court proceeding on charge of contributing
to delinquency of minor since, in such cases,
juvenile court is required to conform to practice
and procedure for criminal proceedings in district court. State v. Taylor, 21 Utah 2d 425, 446
P.2d 954 (1968).
Charge of contributing to the delinquency of
a minor must be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt to support a conviction; uncorroborated
testimony of the victim is sufficient to prove

78-3a-802

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v.
Middelstadt, 579 R2d 908 (Utah 1978).
Sheltering r u n a w a y child.
Providing shelter to runaway child as part of
church program for alienated youth did not
violate section because child was not induced or
encouraged to run away, did not engage in
unlawful or immoral behavior, and was not
exposed to unlawful or immoral activity on the
part of others; defendants had no duty to investigate child's age or residence or to report her to
parents or authorities. State v. Macri, 28 Utah
2d 68, 498 P.2d 355 (1972).
Running away from home by a minor child is
not a violation of law, and if there has been no .
reference to the juvenile court by an agency, the
runaway child is not a delinquent within the
juvenile court's jurisdiction, and any conduct
tending to cause the child to remain a runaway
does not constitute the crime of contributing to
the delinquency of a minor. State v. Dung Hung
Vo, 585 P.2d 464 (Utah 1978).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Child Sexual Abuse
Cases, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 443.
C.J.S. - 43 C.J.S. Infants § 7.
A.L.R. — Criminal liability for contributing
to delinquency of minor as affected by the fact
that minor has not become a delinquent, 18
A.L.R.3d 824.

Mens rea or guilty intent a necessary element of offense of contributing to delinquency
or dependency of minor, 31 A.L.R.3d 848.
Key Numbers. — Infants s=> 18.

78-3a-802, Penalty — Fines — Suspension of sentence on
condition — Bond.
(1) A person 18 years of age or older who commits any act described in this
section is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. Any fines collected shall be
deposited in the treasury of the county where the action is filed.
(2) The court may suspend execution of a sentence upon compliance with
reasonable conditions which the court may establish.
(3) The court may further require that a bond, in a reasonable amount, be
posted by the person convicted under this chapter to guarantee the performance of the condition. The laws and procedures governing bond forfeitures
shall apply in proceedings commenced in this court to forfeit the bond and any
amount so forfeited shall be deposited into the treasury of the county where the
action was brought.
History: C. 1953, 78-3a-802, enacted by L.
1996, ch. 1, § 73.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1996, ch. 1, § 94
makes the act effective on January 31, 1996.

Cross-References. — Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301.
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JUDICIAL CODE

(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a presiding judge from
among the members of the court by majority vote of all judges. The term of
office of the presiding judge is two years and until a successor is elected. A
presiding judge of the Court of Appeals may serve in that office no more than
two successive terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for an acting
presiding judge to serve in the absence or incapacity of the presiding judge.
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the office of presiding judge by
majority vote of all judges of the Court of Appeals. In addition to the duties of
a judge of the Court of Appeals, the presiding judge shall:
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels;
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court;
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the Court of Appeals; and
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme Court and the Judicial
Council.
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the same as for the Supreme
Court.
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-2, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 47, § 45; 1988, ch. 248, § 7.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Stare decisis.
A rule of law pronounced by a panel of the
Court of Appeals governs all later cases involving the same legal issues decided by other

panels of that court and all courts of lower
rank. Renn v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 904
R2d 677 (Utah 1995).

78-2a-3, Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and
to issue all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative
proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public
Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands
actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural
Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of
the state or other local agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases,
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those
involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony;
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence,
14

81

JUVENILE COURTS

History: C. 1953, 78-3a-603, enacted by L.
1996, ch. 1, § 71; 1996, ch. 66, fc 4; 1996, ch.
239, § 3; 1997, ch. 365, § 44.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective March 21, 1997, substituted

78-3a-802

a

78-3a-116" for "78-3a-512w and "78-3a-913" for
78-3a-513" in Subsection (9).
Cross-References. — False statements at
preliminary hearings, § 76-8-504.5.

a

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in A.B. v. State, 936 P.2d 1091 (Utah
Ct. App. 1997).

PART 8
ADULT OFFENSES
78-3a-801. Jurisdiction of adults for offenses against minors — Proof of delinquency not required for
conviction.
(1) The court shall have jurisdiction, concurrent with the district court or
justice court otherwise having subject matter jurisdiction, to try adults for the
following offenses committed against minors:
(a) unlawful sale or supply of alcohol beverage or product to minors in
violation of Section 32A-12-203;
(b) failure to report child abuse or neglect, as required by Title 62A,
Chapter 4a, Part 4, Child Abuse or Neglect Reporting Requirements;
(c) harboring a minor in violation of Section 62A-4a-501;
(d) misdemeanor custodial interference in violation of Section 76-5-303;
(e) contributing to the delinquency of a minor in violation of Section
76-10-2301;
(f) failure to comply with compulsory education requirements in violation of Section 53A-11-101.
(2) It is not necessary for the minor to be found to be delinquent or to have
committed a delinquent act for the court to exercise jurisdiction under
Subsection (1).
History: C. 1953,78-3a-801, enacted by L.
1996, ch. 1, § 72; 1999, ch. 249, § 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 1999 amendment, effective May 3, 1999, rewrote this sec-

tion, substituting the references to statutory
offenses for a list of descriptions of prohibited
conduct;

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
„
,.
Constitutionality.
Supplying alcohol to minors.
Constitutionality.
This statute is not unconstitutionally vague;
the language of this section provides adequate
notice to the ordinary reader of the prohibited
conduct despite the fact that the term "delin-

quent" is not specifically defined. State v.
Krueger, 1999 UT App 54,975 P.2d 489.
Supplying alcohol to minors.
The defendant's mere presence at a drinking
party was not tantamount to permitting minors
to consume alcohol as formerly proscribed by
this section. State v. Terwilliger, 1999 UT App
337, 992 P.2d 490.

78-3a-802. Practice and procedure — Jury trial.
(1) The county attorney or district attorney, as provided under Sections
17-18-1 and 17-18-1.7, shall prosecute any case brought under this part.

ADDENDUM "A5

San Rafael Junior High
Merlin Weber, Principal

Phone(435)384-2335
Fax (435) 384-3354
P.O. Box 790
Ferron, Utah 84523

November 24, 1999
Dear Valery
I've talked with the teachers about the homework, and they will get an assignment for Monday,
but then they &ant you to return it to them for correction before they prepaie more. That would
mean that you'd have to come by school each afternoon to either pick up homework or drop it
off. I hope this will help.
Please remember that if you don't call in to excuse Elise, her attendance records show an
unexcused absence. Also, we were supposed to have doctor's notes for each absence.
Sincerely

Merlin Weber

Emery County School District
Second Excessive Absence Citation
(Fourth, fifth, and sixth unexcused absences)
Student's Name: ^ 7 ; , ^

""7%/?'$<£*>•?>& /j

Grade:_
Date:

School: ^?^si/l
ft/jj&ail
Date of Fourth Unexcused Absence:
// /(?£&l
^L
Q
Q

All Day
Partial Day - Classes:
Individual Class:

Teacher:

Date of Fifth Unexcused Absence^
J#
Q
Q

/1/&,

tf/fifff

All Day
Partial Day - Classes:
Individual Class:

Teacher:

Date of Sixth Unexcused Absence:

///^•y/^/

pC AllDay
Q
Q

Partial Day - Classes:
Individual Class:

Teacher:

This citation is to notify the parent/guardian that the above student now has six (6) unexcused
absences. State law requires the parent/guardian to assist the school in securing regular
attendance of their child and failure to do so can result in a class B misdemeanor charge being
filed against the parent/guardian.

^/^///K^
Title

COMMENT(S): ^

s^ltsj

^

*r&#

ttsW^/fr*SA<2£

Emery County School District
First Excessive Absence Citation
(First, second, and third unexcused absences)
Student's Name: £~/j*)^>

'^Tk^i^t/Pf^^

School: v-^V^

Grade:_
Date:

y-

Date of First Unexcused Absence:

M//fff

/

&
u
Q

All Day
Partial Day - CIasses:_
Individual Class:

Teacher:

Date of Second Unexcused Absence:

J3

All Day

Q
Q

Partial Day - Classes:
Individual Class:

/y

/

Teacher:

Date of Third Unexcused Absence:
^f
Q
Q

////u

/ / / /

All Day
Partial Day - Classes:
Individual Class:

7/^^

Teacher:

This citation is to notify the parent/guardian that the above student has three (3) unexcused
absences. State law requires the parent/guardian to assist the school in securing regular
attendance of their child and failure to do so can result in a class B misdemeanor charge being
filed against the parent/guardian.
District policy requires that one or both parents/guardians attend a meeting with the school
principal/assistant principal to discuss their students attendance problem before the student is
allowed to return to school. Please contact the school as soon as possible to schedule a date and
time.
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ADDENDUM "B

San Rafael Junior High
Merlin Weber, Principal

Phone (435) 384-2335
Fax (435) 384-3354
P.O. Box 790
Ferron, Utah 84523

November 15, 1999
Dear Mr. and Mrs. Thompson
I'm concerned that Elise is still not attending school, and that you don't call to excuse her
anymore. On the days that you don't call to excuse her, if we can't contact you by phone, she
has an unexcused absence. Because of new school attendance laws, it becomes necessary for us
to issue a truancy citation when students have unexcused absences. Because of so many
unexcused absences, she's at the point that she should be referred to court for that problem alone.
I would like to workout an arrangement and get Elise in school. You have a responsibility to get
her to school and I have a responsibility to report when she doesn't attend. I believe that there
must be some way to solve the problem. As I've told you before, we've had students with
serious diabetic problems that we've been able to accommodate with the help and direction of
the parents. Since you live so close, you'd be able to get here quickly when she has problems we
can't handle. Elise has missed so much school that it's going to be difficult for her to return
now, but we'll do everything we can to help her. Please come in and lets talk about how to
solve the problem.
Sincerely

Merlin Weber

